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A B S T R A C T
Organizations increasingly rely on team-based work systems—yet intergroup behavior is predisposed toward
competition, which can render conﬂict management in organizations especially diﬃcult. Based on the in-
tegrative complexity model of group decision-making and the literature on intergroup social dilemmas, we argue
that a lack of quality group discussion (i.e., low integrative complexity) can heighten group members’ sense of
greed toward and fear of other groups—and, by doing so, increase the likelihood that a group will decide to
compete. Accordingly, we propose and evaluate two interventions that target group-discussion dynamics to
promote the integrative complexity of group discussion and intergroup cooperation: structured group discussion
and discussion led by a group member who favors cooperation. Two hundred eighty-ﬁve participants were
assigned to groups of three and played an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Results demonstrate that partici-
pating in a structured group discussion increased the integrative complexity of group discussion, during which
diﬀerent perspectives were fully deliberated before making a ﬁnal decision. This, in turn, decreased the sense of
greed and fear, and reduced the likelihood that a group would decide to compete against other groups. In
contrast, a cooperative discussion leader was only helpful in reducing group decisions to compete in the ﬁrst
round: Because it did not increase the integrative complexity of group discussion, this method failed to motivate
cooperation over time. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
1. Introduction
Intergroup conﬂicts and tensions can cause extensive damage, yet
they arise frequently. Whether the competing groups are nations, po-
litical parties, ethnic groups, or companies, egregious acts are re-
peatedly committed by one group against the other. What psychological
mechanism causes a group to be so prone to compete? Why are groups
so shortsighted that they choose an extreme act instead of being ﬂex-
ible? How can groups resolve conﬂicts and cooperate? As reliance on
work groups grows in organizations, this lack of coordination between
groups can be costly on a number of levels (Blake, Shepard, & Mouton,
1964; Hinsz & Betts, 2011).1 For example, work groups may hoard
information to maintain their high status within an organization, even
though sharing information would enhance overall performance, or
refuse to allocate critical resources that rival groups need to achieve
higher levels of performance. Work groups may also fail to negotiate an
optimal solution. The value of knowing how to manage intergroup
cooperation and competition is reﬂected in every call to build prosocial
and cooperative relationships in organizations (e.g., Demoulin & De
Dreu, 2010; Insko, Wildschut, & Cohen, 2013; Kugler & Bornstein,
2013).
Social-dilemma studies of intergroup relations have demonstrated
that increased greed and fear are important determinants of intergroup
conﬂict and competition (e.g., Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz,
1990; Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, &
Schopler, 2003). Greed denotes a group’s selﬁsh motive to maximize its
own outcomes relative to the opponent. Fear denotes a group’s distrust
of the opponent, which encourages a group to compete as a form of
preemptive action. People experience a heightened sense of greed in
groups as the group provides a “shield of anonymity” that promotes
egotistic, competitive decision-making against other groups (e.g.,
Schopler et al., 1993; Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). In-group
favoritism norms exist in groups, which manifest as a moral double
standard whereby actions toward in-group members are prosocial and
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reciprocal, and actions toward out-group members are egoistic and
exploitative (Tajfel, 1982). In addition, due to vigilance against and
distrust of out-groups as a result of the apparently shared belief that
groups are ruthless and more aggressive, intergroup relations are often
subject to fear (Hoyle, Pinkley, & Insko, 1989; Insko et al., 1990;
Messick & Mackie, 1989). Competitive intergroup interactions are often
heightened over time as groups adopt competition as a defensive tactic
(Hoyle et al., 1989). Indeed, the presence of a strong conﬂict scheme
and a norm of in-group favoritism prevents groups from drawing on the
collective’s greater cognitive potential and attaining the beneﬁts of
mutual cooperation (Charness & Sutter, 2012; Kugler & Bornstein,
2013; Wildschut et al., 2003).
While there has been extensive research on the factors that con-
tribute to greed and fear as the key determinants for intergroup conﬂict,
group decision-making dynamics by which greed and fear act on group
decisions to cooperate or compete have received surprisingly little at-
tention. Yet psychologists have suggested a close link between group
decision-making dynamics—speciﬁcally, the quality of the group’s de-
cision-making process—and intergroup conﬂict (e.g., Suedfeld, 2010;
Tetlock, 1998; Wildschut et al., 2003). Indeed, situations that involve
intergroup conﬂict are rarely conducive to highly complex decision-
making. Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) have shown that international
crises are exacerbated when the nations involved make premature
group decisions that fail to consider the full scope of the relevant issues
(i.e., low information-processing complexity). Intergroup social di-
lemma research has consistently demonstrated that groups are often
blinded to the possible consequences of their actions, because the in-
tergroup context carries an increased sense of greed, fear, and bias
against the out-group (Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Wildschut et al., 2003).
In his original groupthink case studies, Janis (1982) reported that in the
presence of intergroup tension, group members tend to quickly polarize
in their opinions, adopt a stereotyped view of the out-group, and dis-
play heightened aggression. When it comes to intergroup relations,
groups are at high risk of falling into a downward spiral, in which the
inherent tension between groups activates a simpliﬁed, consensus-
seeking decision-making process that, in turn, further aggravates in-
tergroup conﬂict. In this study, we examine the impact of group deci-
sion-making dynamics on intergroup relations. More speciﬁcally, what
is the eﬀect of high-quality decision-making on intergroup relations?
Would groups that engage in high-quality decision-making processes be
able to sustain better cooperation over time?
Using the integrative complexity approach to intergroup relation-
ships, we argue that intergroup competition is due, in part, to a lack of
systematic, thorough processing of information during the group’s de-
cision-making process. Stemming from cognitive complexity theory,
which focuses on individual diﬀerences in depth of information pro-
cessing (i.e., need for cognition or epistemic motives), studies of group
integrative complexity demonstrate that groups diﬀer in their use of
heuristic-driven, consensus-seeking decision-making or systematic and
deliberative decision-making (e.g., Scholten, Van Knippenberg, Nijstad,
& De Dreu, 2007; Suedfeld, 2010; Tetlock, 1998). Speciﬁcally, the in-
tegrative complexity of groups is high when they are exposed to mul-
tiple perspectives or dimensions of an issue (i.e., diﬀerentiation) and
understand how the diﬀerent perspectives are related (i.e., integration);
such groups make higher-quality decisions (Gruenfeld, 1995). Past
studies have identiﬁed various factors that reduce a group’s integrative
complexity, such as lack of accountability, a strong consensus norm,
time pressure, and a sense of threats to the group’s status (e.g., Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999; Scholten et al., 2007; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981;
Suedfeld & Wallbaum, 1992).
For this study, we examine the integrative complexity of groups as
an antecedent of cooperative intergroup relations (Fig. 1). Groups in
our sample engaged in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, which al-
lowed us to identify the eﬀects of high-quality group discussion on
groups’ success in achieving and maintaining a cooperative relation-
ship, in which both groups enjoy the optimal shared outcome.
Speciﬁcally, we examined two discussion interventions with the ex-
pectation that, in a repeated interaction, they would diﬀer in their
ability to increase the quality of group discussions and maintain an
initial desire to cooperate. The ﬁrst condition employed structured
group discussion, and the second used group discussion led by a co-
operative group member. Group discussions were rated in terms of in-
tegrative complexity, which reﬂects the extent to which groups con-
sidered multiple perspectives and how they were interrelated. In
addition, and consistent with previous intergroup social-dilemma stu-
dies, we examined greed and fear as mediating variables that shape a
group’s decision to compete or cooperate with other groups. Our focus,
therefore, is to examine how group integrative complexity predicts
greed, fear, and decisions to cooperate with other groups, such that
group decision-making dynamics uniquely contribute to our under-
standing of how intergroup relations can be better managed.
1.1. Integrative complexity of group decision-making and intergroup
relations
Group decision-making is often a preferred way of making inter-
group decisions, not only because intergroup relations have signiﬁcant
implications for the fate of group constituencies, but also because the
group’s increased pool of information increases its ability to reach a
well-informed decision (Kugler, Kausel, & Kocher, 2012). Group dis-
cussion functions as a collective information-processing mechanism
that involves searching for diverse information, interpreting the con-
sequences of various strategies, and forming a collective judgment
(Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). Through group discussion, members
move from uncertainty to consensus, during which diﬀerent perspec-
tives are explored to shape group-level attitudes and decisions (Fisher,
1991). Group discussion allows groups to engage in active reconcilia-
tion and integration of group members’ perspectives, ideas, and argu-
ments, which facilitate the emergence of consensus on decisions. In
addition, group authorities are a salient aspect of intergroup attitude,
whereby their opinions and endorsement often play an essential role in
the group’s decision against the out-group (Pettigrew, 1998).
In this study, we suggest that the integrative complexity of group
decision-making could positively contribute to intergroup relations. At
low levels of integrative complexity during group discussion, groups are
less likely to reap such beneﬁts of collective information processing, as
group decisions are subject to simple, collective heuristics that are
commonly held by individual members (Gruenfeld, 1995). Morgan and
Tindale (2002) have shown that shared representations of greed and
fear against out-groups function as a heuristic basis for groups’ deci-
sions to compete with other groups. Accordingly, they argue that salient
intergroup contexts allow exploitative sentiments to quickly spread
through group discussion, causing group decisions to become polarized
in favor of competition.
In addition to in-group favoritism norms that pressure individual
members to prioritize the maximization of selﬁsh outcomes for their
own group at the expense of other groups, this intergroup context also
activates the learned stereotype of out-groups as competitive and un-
trustworthy, which in turn makes the decision to compete an obvious
course of action (Insko et al., 1990). At low levels of integrative com-
plexity, groups fail to consider and deliberate on multiple views and
perspectives, relying instead on more rigid, narrower, and fewer per-
spectives (Gruenfeld, 1995), thus missing out on the opportunity to
learn and gain more from each interaction in the discussion. That is,
each episode of intergroup interaction would mainly be interpreted as
mere conﬁrmations or disconﬁrmations of their pre-existing perspec-
tives (e.g., “We were right about them,” “We are not right about them”),
while failing to capitalize on the opportunity to reconsider or re-
conﬁgure their perspectives and build a deeper, richer, and more
nuanced understanding.
In contrast, with high integrative complexity, trade-oﬀs between
diﬀerent alternatives are deliberated more deeply during group
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discussion, and there is greater reconciliation of diﬀerent views and
ideas expressed by group members (Gruenfeld, 1995). Studies on in-
dividuals’ attitudes against out-groups consistently show that in-
dividuals with high cognitive complexity are less likely to rely on ste-
reotypes and black-and-white judgments against out-groups, which in
turn is generally associated with decreased hostility against out-groups
(e.g., Golec & Federico, 2004; Zavala, Golec, Cislak, & Wesolowska,
2010). Groups with a high level of integrative complexity would be less
aﬀected by the heuristics associated with intergroup relations, such as
in-group favoritism and out-group distrust, and they are also less likely
to exhibit stereotypical reactions guided by greed and fear against other
groups.
Groups with high levels of integrative complexity are also unlikely
to passively accept other group members’ opinions during discussion;
instead, diﬀerent opinions held by other group members would be ac-
tively deliberated, clariﬁed, and integrated (Gruenfeld & Preston,
2000). Going beyond simply taking each other’s opinions at face value,
complex reasoning enables groups to identify multiple dimensions that
underlie the issues at stake that were not obvious at the onset of dis-
cussion. The relative merits and trade-oﬀs associated with each alter-
native are more likely to be discovered and deliberated, thus reducing
the likelihood that overly simplistic and rigid approaches toward op-
ponent groups will be adopted (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977). At high le-
vels of integrative complexity, group discussion allows groups to ap-
preciate the richness of issues wherein there is no universally superior
decision that can be made, and also encourages groups to adopt an
open, ﬂexible mindset when interacting and exchanging ideas with
opponent groups. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1. Group information-processing complexity is positively
correlated with intergroup cooperation.
Hypothesis 2. Greed and fear mediate H1 such that group information-
processing complexity has an indirect eﬀect on intergroup cooperation
through a decrease in greed and fear.
1.2. Structured discussion and group integrative complexity
Accordingly, this study proposes and examines two interventions
that diﬀerentially facilitate integrative complexity and subsequent in-
tergroup relations. Previous studies of group decision-making suggest
that the design of a group’s decision-making process inﬂuences how
groups process information, and therefore choosing a suitable inter-
vention is one of the most important determinants of the group’s ef-
fectiveness (Schafer & Crichlow, 1996). The ﬁrst intervention is called
structured discussion, in which groups are encouraged to consider and
discuss multiple dimensions (i.e., the pros and cons) of diﬀerent alter-
natives (e.g., to cooperate or compete) before they make a decision.
Groups tend to reach consensus by negotiating the ﬁnal decision based
on group members’ initial preferences instead of integrating diﬀerences
in their perspectives (Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt,
2010). Structured discussion prevents groups from encountering these
typical decision-making pitfalls and encourages them to engage in a
deeper and more thorough consideration of diﬀerent opinions and
perspectives.
For example, Stewart and Stasser (1995) assert that structured
group discussion allows a group to optimize its cognitive potential and
increases the likelihood that the group will successfully complete a
problem-solving task (see also Larsen, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994).
Janis (1989) also recommends that groups spend some time deliber-
ating on their potential decision’s pros and cons, as this prevents mis-
perceptions and deters group members from simply going along with
whatever consensus appears to be emerging during group discussion.
We expected that structured discussion would increase groups’ in-
tegrative complexity by exposing group members to diﬀerent alter-
natives (i.e., diﬀerentiation) and encouraging them to engage in active
discussion of diﬀerent alternatives (i.e., integration). Accordingly,
structured discussion would facilitate groups’ engagement in systematic
information processing and increase the integrative complexity of
group discussion. Structured group discussion would trigger an active
deliberation process whereby groups reconcile the diﬀerent opinions
and perspectives held by group members and reach consensus through
complex reasoning. By discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
alternatives, groups learn about the trade-oﬀs associated with each al-
ternative and become more open to diﬀerent perspectives held by
members. The manifested diﬀerences in group members’ initial opi-
nions would be reconciled by deliberating on the underlying reasons
behind preferences—and, in turn, learn when and how each perspective
would be relevant instead of relying on simple, one-dimensional eva-
luative rules.
With structured discussion, therefore, diﬀerent perspectives and
dimensions of an issue are more likely to be considered during the
decision-making process, which determines the quality of the ﬁnal
decision; additionally, high levels of diﬀerentiation and integration are
likely to precede high-quality decisions (Gruenfeld & Preston, 2000;
Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992). Speciﬁcally, in a context of high
diﬀerentiation, a decision maker acknowledges and understands di-
verse perspectives; in a context of high integration, the decision maker
comprehends the underlying relationships among the diﬀerent per-
spectives and incorporates these diﬀerent perspectives adequately
when reaching a decision. Engaging in structured discussion is a posi-
tive stimulus and provides groups with opportunities to unleash their
cognitive potential through consideration of diﬀerent hypothetical
scenarios, as well as the consequences of choosing diﬀerent actions in a
repeated interaction.
Hypothesis 3. Structured discussions promote the information-
processing complexity of groups.
1.3. Cooperative-leader discussion and group integrative complexity
While the ﬁrst intervention tested the idea that integrative com-
plexity shapes how groups reach decisions, the second intervention was
inspired by a notion of leaders and their impact on integrative com-
plexity and intergroup decision-making (Schafer & Crichlow, 1996). For
a variety of reasons, we believe it is important to test the group dis-
cussion leader’s inﬂuence on group integrative complexity and deci-
sions to cooperate. First, previous studies suggest that authorities in
groups play a salient role in the collective decision-making process and
the quality of decisions made (e.g., Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Franz,
1998). Second, studies of group integrative complexity have long re-
cognized the leader’s signiﬁcant role in a group’s integrative com-
plexity. For instance, Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk (1993) analyzed
Fig. 1. The eﬀects of group discussion dynamic
on integrative complexity and intergroup rela-
tions in social dilemmas.
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speeches by the leaders of nations involved in international crises, and
his/her individual cognitive complexity was used as a proxy for the
integrative complexity of the administrative group (see also Suedfeld &
Leighton, 2002). Finally, the literature of intergroup conﬂict places
great emphasis on a leader’s support for intergroup harmony and co-
operation as one of the key antecedents of positive intergroup re-
lationships (Pettigrew, 1998). Given the important role leaders play in
organizations, determining whether a cooperative discussion leader can
potentially encourage a group to be more cooperative with other groups
has important practical implications.
Accordingly, in our second intervention, the cooperative-leader dis-
cussion, a cooperative group member leads the group in discussion of
decisions. While the ﬁrst intervention changes how information pro-
cessing is structured, this intervention focuses on the eﬀect of the group
authority’s opinion on intergroup relations. Speciﬁcally, does having a
discussion leader who favors cooperation make a diﬀerence in the in-
tegrative complexity of group decision-making? Does the eﬀect of a
cooperative discussion leader on group decisions and attitudes last over
multiple interactions, even in the case of hostile intergroup relations?
While this is not expected to facilitate the quality of group discus-
sion (i.e., integrative complexity), the eﬀect of cooperative-leader dis-
cussion on a group’s decision to cooperate will be positive in general,
and especially in the initial stages, when team members are more
subject to normative power. Previous studies have shown that the dis-
cussion leader can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on group decisions. Groups
have a strong tendency to start their discussions by disclosing group
members’ individual preferences, and thus group members engage in
the social comparison of opinions early on Gigone and Hastie (1993).
This convention triggers normative inﬂuence derived from each group
member’s desire to meet the expectations of other group members
(Campbell & Fairey, 1989). Disagreeing with a fellow group member
can be uncomfortable, especially when that group member has higher
status (Gerard & Rotter, 1961). Thus, group members often conform to
expectations so that they can ingratiate themselves to others while
avoiding ridicule. For instance, in their theory of social power, Larson
et al. (1998) argue that group discussion leaders exert a strong inﬂu-
ence on the group discussion process and the quality of group decisions.
Similarly, Kameda, Tindale, and Davis (2003) found that the opinions
expressed by group authorities at the onset of group discussion sig-
niﬁcantly inﬂuenced the group’s consensus-seeking process and even-
tual decision.
As noted above, however, although a cooperative discussion leader
can change a group’s cooperative decisions in the short term, it is un-
likely that such normative pressure on the group’s decision-making
would increase its integrative complexity. That is, a cooperative-leader
intervention may increase the group’s exposure to diﬀerent perspectives
(i.e., diﬀerentiation), but integrative complexity theory argues that
mere exposure to diﬀerent perspectives does not automatically compel
a group to integrate them (Gruenfeld, 1995). Mojzisch and Schulz-
Hardt (2010) found that awareness of diﬀerences in group members’
opinions caused groups to engage in shallow chatter—and, as a result,
group members paid less attention to the information exchanged during
discussion and quickly arrived at a consensus. More speciﬁcally, di-
versity in opinions and perspectives reduced group information pro-
cessing quality by triggering consensus-seeking heuristics, which cause
groups to seek quick settlements (see also Gigone & Hastie, 1993). In
addition, the presence of a leader can discourage group members from
assuming responsibility for group discussions, leading to passivity and
uncritical engagement in the consideration of ideas and opinions ad-
vocated by other group members. Further, the group development lit-
erature has consistently shown that such normative inﬂuence is stron-
gest during the early phases of social interaction (French, 1956).
1.4. Sustaining cooperative relationships over time
In this section we build on our discussion of the eﬀectiveness of a
cooperative-leader condition for intergroup cooperation over time, and
further argue that groups that reach decisions using a high-quality
decision-making process are better able to sustain intergroup coopera-
tion than groups that do not. In a repeated interaction of coordination,
such as an intergroup prisoner’s dilemma game, the dominant strategy
is to compete. That is, regardless of the opponent’s choices, choosing to
compete gives the group the higher expected outcome on any given
round (Nash, 1950), especially for intergroup interactions in which
factors such as an intergroup conﬂict scheme and in-group favoritism
make it more diﬃcult for groups to revert to cooperative relations once
conﬂict has occurred. Therefore, cooperative relationships are fragile
and diﬃcult to sustain, while competitive relationships are more rigid
and diﬃcult to break out of.
In a related vein, in their review of economic games played by
groups vs. individuals, Kugler et al. (2012) report that groups suﬀer less
cognitive limitation and make fewer logical errors in general, with the
exception of those games that require intergroup trust and cooperation;
in those cases, group decisions demonstrate a strong bias toward
competition. Groups return signiﬁcantly fewer points than the other
group, such that they are less likely to reciprocate the other group’s
cooperation and more likely to take advantage of its cooperative intent
(Cox, 2002; Song, 2009). Groups are more likely to seek revenge on a
noncooperative opponent and less likely to forgive those who pre-
viously wronged them (Rabbie, 1998).
An outbreak of competition heightens out-group hate and in-group
love when groups rely on black-and-white evaluations that favor the in-
group. Intergroup conﬂict strengthens the individual’s prior associa-
tions, which are biased against the out-group; the desire to quickly
formulate and ﬁrmly hold onto one’s opinion is especially intense in the
context of intergroup conﬂict (Golec & Federico, 2004). Accordingly,
groups strongly resist changing their hostile attitude toward the out-
group, and members become convinced that reaching a quick consensus
to compete is the only legitimate option to protect themselves from the
out-group (Conway, Gornick, Houck, Towgood, & Conway, 2011).
Unless there is an explicit process that compels groups to consider al-
ternative perspectives, intergroup conﬂict will exacerbate the hostile
interaction and solidify tensions.
Structured discussion renders groups more likely to consider alter-
native views and perspectives during decision-making. A thorough
discussion of various aspects of the situation and implications of
adopting diﬀerent strategies would increase the odds of ﬁnding best-ﬁt
solutions to resolve the conﬂict. In contrast, groups without structured
discussion would be more likely to fall prey to a high level of rigidity
and heuristic-driven decision-making that pushes groups to keep com-
peting. Because the cooperative-leader intervention primarily relies on
the conforming pressure the cooperate leader exerts, it is insuﬃcient to
profoundly change the group’s understanding of and orientation toward
the out-group. Therefore, we expected that cooperative-leader groups
would be more likely to favor intergroup cooperation than control
groups. However, because this intervention eﬀect mainly relies on
normative-conforming pressure from a cooperative discussion leader,
we expect that the eﬀect of such a leader on cooperative-leader groups
would be the highest in the initial round, then fade over time
Hypothesis 4. Cooperative-leader groups will have high level of
intergroup cooperation in early decisions but will not maintain
intergroup cooperation over time.
1.5. Study overview
Consistent with previous studies of intergroup competition, we used
an intergroup prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) in which both parties
simultaneously choose to cooperate or compete with the other party in
multiple trials. Because of its high levels of internal and external va-
lidity, the PDG is one of the most popular methods of studying com-
petition and cooperation across diﬀerent domains of social sciences
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(e.g., Charness & Sutter, 2012; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Wildschut
et al., 2003). In a PDG task, the two parties’ outcomes are negatively
related: The choice that maximizes one party’s outcome will minimize
the opponent’s outcome (Fig. 2). While both parties could attain the
best possible joint outcome through cooperation, groups are rendered
shortsighted by the intensiﬁed greed and fear that dominate intergroup
relations. Groups consisted of three individuals who made a decision
about an intergroup social dilemma. In addition to a control con-
dition—in which groups engaged in decision-making without any in-
tervention—two intervention conditions allowed us to examine how a
group’s information-processing complexity aﬀects intergroup relations.
In line with previous studies, to examine the eﬀect of the two in-
terventions on group information-processing complexity, we coded
video recordings of group discussions based on a modiﬁed version of
the integrative complexity scheme (e.g., Baker-Brown et al., 1992;
Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 1993; Gruenfeld & Preston, 2000). Although
the original coding scheme was geared more toward archival studies, in
which public statements made by a policy-making group working on a
problem-solving task were coded, the authors of the coding scheme
have encouraged other researchers to adapt it for the purposes of rating
group integrative complexity in various other contexts and tasks. Ac-
cordingly, researchers have successfully adapted the coding scheme to
rate the integrative complexity of groups working on diﬀerent tasks,
such as top management teams in organizations, Supreme Court jus-
tices, and student project teams at a university (e.g., Gruenfeld &
Hollingshead, 1993; Gruenfeld & Preston, 2000; Wong, Ormiston, &
Tetlock, 2011). In addition, the coding scheme has been used for
samples collected in experimental settings and applied to a variety of
materials, such as diaries, interviews, and thought protocols (e.g., De
Vries & Walker, 1987; Tetlock, 1998).
In addition to coding group discussions, we employed social deci-
sion scheme (SDS) analysis to examine the eﬀects of the two inter-
ventions on group social-inﬂuence processes (Davis, 1973; Morgan &
Tindale, 2002). Speciﬁcally, we asked individual group members to
privately reach a decision about the PDG prior to group discussion. The
dynamics between pre-discussion individual preference distributions
and ﬁnal group decisions were then ﬁtted against plausible models (also
known as decision schemes), such as majority rule, proportionality
rules, or equiprobability rules (Davis, 1973). This method allowed us to
describe the group’s underlying judgment or decision process. As ex-
amples, Laughlin (1980) has applied this approach to problem solving
in groups/teams; Davis (1980) employed it to examine jury decision-
making; Hinsz (1999) outlined how responses of a quantitative nature
could be investigated; Stasser, Kerr, and Davis (1989) considered al-
ternative approaches that allow greater focus on the dynamics of de-
liberation; and Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1996) used it to examine
biases in group and individual judgment. Relevant to this study,
Morgan and Tindale (2002) found that groups with a competitive
intergroup norm were susceptible to competitive bias, such that a fac-
tion holding competitive opinions exerted much greater inﬂuence on
group decisions than a faction holding cooperative opinions. In our
study, using SDS analysis, we examined how structured discussion in-
ﬂuences the combinatorial process of two alternatives.
2. Method
2.1. Design overview
Our experimental design contained three group conditions, in which
two interacting groups (a pair of groups) were assigned to the same
condition. In control groups, group members received no manipulation.
In a structured-discussion condition, group members were encouraged
to participate in a balanced discussion of each alternative. In a co-
operative-leader condition, the most cooperative group member was
asked to lead group discussions.2. Each condition was designed to ex-
amine the eﬀect of diﬀerent discussion dynamics on groups’ decisions
to compete. In addition, group-level greed and fear were measured at
the end of each group discussion to determine the extent to which each
intervention successfully suppressed group members’ levels of greed
and fear. Two interacting groups played six rounds of the PDG. In each
round, groups decided to either cooperate or compete with the op-
posing group. To minimize confounding eﬀects related to strategic
moves, participants were not informed of the exact number of rounds
they would be playing. The PDG matrix used in the study is depicted in
Fig. 2. In each round, subjects were asked to choose between Option 1
(decision to cooperate) and Option 2 (decision to compete). Decisions
were made simultaneously—that is, each group made its decision
without knowing the opposing group’s decision. After each round,
participants received a coupon stating the amount of money they had
earned, which they could cash at the end of the experiment.
2.2. Participants
A total of 285 undergraduate college students from a large mid-
western university in the U.S. participated in the study: 87 individuals
(29 groups) participated in the control group condition; 102 individuals
(34 groups) participated in the structured-discussion condition; and 96
individuals (32 groups) participated in the cooperative-leader condi-
tion.3 All participants were volunteers who received course credit for
participating in the two-hour experiment. Of the participants, 60%
were female, and most (89%) were between 18 and 22 years old.
2.3. Procedure
Six individuals arrived for each experimental session. Upon arrival,
participants read and signed the informed consent form and drew index
cards to randomly determine their room assignments (Room A or Room
B) and member numbers (Member 1, Member 2, or Member 3). Three
rooms were used: one neutral room and two group rooms, one labeled
“A” and the other “B.” Each group room had one table. Three
Fig. 2. Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoﬀ Matrix Used in the Study.
2 The original study had an individual condition in which two individuals played the
PDG for six rounds. Because the focus of this study is group-discussion dynamics, we do
not include the individual condition. The individual condition (32 individuals) yielded
the highest cooperation rates across rounds (M=94.25%). Using ANOVA, the individual
and group control conditions were analyzed in terms of the mean number of cooperation
across six rounds. The results showed signiﬁcantly lower cooperation rates in the group
control condition compared to the individual condition, F(1, 59)= 46.51, p < .01;
therefore, the result replicated the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity eﬀect
(Wildschut et al., 2003).
3 We based our sample size on previous studies that used an intergroup PDG and on
group information-processing studies that typically had 12–25 groups per condition (e.g.,
Hoever, Van Knippenberg, Van Ginkel, & Barkema, 2012; Insko et al., 1990; Pinter et al.,
2007), but we used larger sample sizes to obtain a power of approximately 0.80 to
identify a medium-size eﬀect.
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participants were assigned to Room A and three to Room B, and par-
ticipants were informed that they would be interacting with the group
in the other room. Participants were then given instructions regarding
the choice combinations in the PDG matrix and tested on their under-
standing of the matrix, after which the experimenter scored all tests to
ensure that each participant understood it. Participants were then told
that they would complete multiple rounds of the PDG and that each
group would be dismissed separately.
Next, the experimenter described the trial sequence. Three partici-
pants sat around a table in a group room and were told they would be
working as a group. First, participants had 1min to rate their pre-
ferences for Option 1 or Option 2 and make individual decisions
without speaking to the others (Figure A in supplemental materials).
The experimenter then collected the individual rating sheets and dis-
tributed a group decision-making sheet. Participants then had 2min to
reach their group decision. They were given a discussion worksheet
(Figure B in supplemental materials) to guide their discussion, with text
that oﬀered pros and cons for both options. Participants in the control
group and cooperative-leader conditions were informed that using the
worksheet was optional. After the 2-min group discussion, each group
selected a representative. The representative left his/her group room
and had 1min to speak with the representative of the opposing group in
the neutral room about any topic, including the matrix, and were told
that their verbal commitment would not be binding. After the 1-min
meeting, each representative was escorted to his/her group room and
given 1min to make the ﬁnal decision with his/her group. After the
experimenter collected the group decision sheets, she informed each
group of the opposing group’s decision. The experimenter then dis-
tributed cash coupons based on the amount of money participants had
earned for that round, and began the next round.
In the structured-discussion condition, the procedures were the
same as in the control-group condition, except that groups were re-
quired to use the group-discussion worksheet (Figure B in supplemental
materials) during the 2-min group discussion. To reiterate, groups in all
conditions were given the discussion worksheet at the onset of group
discussion—to ensure that every group had an equal opportunity to use
it—but only groups in the structured-discussion condition were re-
quired to complete the worksheet.
In the cooperative-leader condition, procedures were the same as in
the control-group condition, except that the most cooperative in-
dividual in each group was asked to lead the 2-min group discussion.
Speciﬁcally, after group members were given 1min to rate their in-
dividual preferences for Option 1 or Option 2 on a scale of 1 (not at all)
to 5 (extremely) (Figure A in supplemental materials), the experimenter
collected the rating sheets and privately calculated individual pre-
ference ratings for cooperation and competition. Next, the experimenter
asked a group member to draw one stick from a cup to randomly de-
termine which member would start the group discussion. Although the
cup contained three sticks, each of which ostensibly had a diﬀerent
group member’s number (i.e., 1, 2, or 3), all three sticks had the most
cooperative individual’s number. That person was then instructed to
initiate and lead the group discussion. When two or three group
members showed the same level of preference for cooperation, the
experimenter randomly chose the member who would be selected to
speak ﬁrst. It must be emphasized that participants in all conditions
were asked to complete individual sheets (Figure A in supplemental
materials). However, this information was only used in the cooperative-
leader condition to determine who would lead the discussion.
3. Measures
3.1. Individual decisions and preference ratings
At the beginning of every round, before engaging in group discus-
sion, group members reported in writing their preference ratings for
Option 1 (cooperate) and Option 2 (compete) and their individual
decisions: Option 1 (cooperate) or Option 2 (compete) (Figure A in
supplemental materials).
3.2. Group decision
During each decision episode, groups reported their group decision
in writing: Option 1 (cooperate) or Option 2 (compete).
3.3. Intergroup attitude—greed and fear
Group greed, which denotes the extent to which the group has a
noncooperative, competitive attitude toward the other group, was
measured using one item adopted from previous studies of intergroup
social dilemmas (e.g., Insko et al., 1990, 2013; Wildschut et al., 2003):
“My group wants to earn more than the opponent.” Group members
reported their agreement with the statement on a 7-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). For each round,
the measure was administered immediately after the group discussion
and prior to announcement of the opposing group’s decision.
Group fear, which denotes the extent to which a group distrusts the
other group, was measured using one item adopted from previous
studies of intergroup social dilemmas (e.g., Insko et al., 1990, 2013;
Wildschut et al., 2003): “My group does not trust the opponent.” Group
members rated their agreement with the statement on a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). For each
round, the measure was administered immediately after the group
discussion and prior to announcement of the opposing group’s decision.
3.4. Integrative complexity of group discussion
Group discussions were coded for integrative complexity by two
raters using a modiﬁed version of an integrative complexity coding
scheme (see Baker-Brown et al., 1992, for detailed coding instructions).
Integrative-complexity coding captures the extent to which groups re-
cognize multiple perspectives (i.e., diﬀerentiation) and trade-oﬀs, or
interrelationships between diﬀerent alternatives (i.e., integration;
Gruenfeld & Preston, 2000). Scores were assigned using a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 to 5.
Scores of 1 were given when a group did not discuss multiple per-
spectives and maintained an one-dimensional perspective on the si-
tuation—for example, when group members unilaterally agreed on one
alternative without any further discussion (e.g., “There is no better
decision than [Option 1]”; “It’s stupid to choose Option 2”).
Scores of 2 were given when a group discussed some rudimentary
form of multiple perspectives—for example, when a group mentioned
an alternative only to quickly dismiss it without proper consideration,
(e.g., “[Option 1] can build trust, but we want more money”; “I know
we could choose [Option 2], but Option 1 is fair”).
Scores of 3 were given when a group discussed multiple perspectives
but exerted minimal eﬀort to integrate them—for instance, when a
group mainly focused on comparing and contrasting diﬀerent alter-
natives (e.g., “Option 2 maximizes our beneﬁt; on the other hand,
Option 1 maximizes the beneﬁts of both groups”; “Option 1 can
maintain trust; Option 2 can ruin trust”).
Scores of 4 were given when group discussion indicated clear re-
cognition of multiple perspectives and moderate integration of
them—for example, if a group discussed the reciprocity of the re-
lationships and/or tensions between perspectives (e.g., “Option 1 is
likely to give the most beneﬁts, assuming the opponent trusts us;
otherwise, Option 2 would be safe”; “Option 2 runs the risk of re-
taliation, where they are not going to trust us choosing Option1 any-
more”).
Scores of 5 were given when group discussion involved a clear re-
cognition of multiple perspectives and high integration of them—for
instance, when a group discussed hypothetical situations, during which
they achieved a global view of integrating principles (e.g., “Choosing
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Option 1 can be risky, but we will increase our chance to regain trust
because of that and eventually would be better for both groups in the
long run”; “By choosing Option 2 this round, we are showing that they
cannot take advantage of us anymore, and this will give them a warning
sign for upcoming rounds”).
Because of technical diﬃculties, videorecordings of six groups were
not properly recorded, which left a total of 89 video recordings of group
discussions. The two coders rated 20 teams and displayed high levels of
reliability and agreement. We estimated the convergence between co-
ders by estimating the mean rwg coeﬃcient and two ICCs. All three
measures were acceptable, suggesting adequate levels of agreement and
reliability (rwg=0.87; ICC1=0.65; ICC2=0.78). Each of the coders
then rated roughly half of the remaining 69 videos.
3.5. Compliance with cooperative opinion
We expected that cooperative-leader discussion would fail to in-
crease integrative complexity, because it would mainly rely on the
normative power the discussion leader possesses during discussion. To
test this expectation, we measured the extent to which team members
expressed compliance with cooperative opinion. For each round, coders
also assessed group members’ compliance with cooperation. When one
or more members of a group showed explicit and immediate agreement
with cooperative opinions, the round was coded as 1; otherwise, the
round was coded as 0. Examples of relevant utterances include:
• Person 1: “I think we should choose Option 1.”
Person 2: “Yeah.”
• Person 1: “We are choosing Option 1 for sure.”
Person 2: “Okay.”
• Person 1: “I really like Option 1.”
Person 2: “Yup; I already circled Option 1.”
Videorecordings of 10 randomly chosen groups (a total of 60
rounds) were coded by both raters. The coders agreed 95% of the time
when coding compliance with cooperative opinion; again, the interrater
agreement index was good, with κ=0.90. After obtaining the estimate
of interrater agreement, each coder then coded roughly half of the re-
maining videorecordings.
4. Results
4.1. Manipulation checks
4.1.1. Structured-discussion condition
In the structured-discussion condition, groups were required to
complete a discussion worksheet to prompt balanced discussion of co-
operative and competitive decisions (Figure B in supplemental mate-
rials). To determine the success of the manipulation, we compared the
number of times the worksheet was completed in the structured-dis-
cussion condition to the number of times it was completed in the other
conditions. Groups were more likely to complete the worksheet in the
structured-discussion condition (97%) than in the other conditions (4%
in the control condition and 7% in the cooperative-leader condition).
4.1.2. Cooperative-leader condition
In the cooperative-leader condition, the member who reported the
greatest preference for cooperation was asked to lead the group dis-
cussion for that round. We examined video footage of the actual group
discussion to determine whether the person who had been chosen to
lead the discussion actually led the discussion. Results showed that 96%
of the time, the designated leader spoke ﬁrst and proceeded to lead the
discussion. In addition, during the debrieﬁng process, no participants
expressed suspicion that we had arbitrarily chosen the most cooperative
group member to lead the group discussion.
4.2. Preliminary examination of cooperation rates
Cooperation choices for each condition over time are presented in
Table 1 and Fig. 2. Groups in the control condition yielded the lowest
cooperation rates over time (M=57%). In contrast, the structured-
discussion groups yielded the highest cooperation rates among the
group conditions (M=85%). Groups in the cooperative-leader condi-
tion had high cooperation rates in the ﬁrst three rounds, but, as ex-
pected, their rates decreased over time (M=71%). All three con-
ditions—control, structured discussion, and cooperative leader—were
compared in terms of the mean number of cooperative decisions across
six rounds.4
4.3. Overview of analyses
Groups made multiple decisions over time in this study, by which
multiple decisions were embedded under each group. The nested
structure of the data violates the assumption of OLS regression, because
multiple measurements under each group are clustered with one an-
other. Accordingly, all hypotheses were tested using HLM (Raudenbush
& Bryk, 2002) using the HLM 6 program.5 Round level was the level 1
Table 1
Means and standard deviations for dependent variables.
Variables Control Con Structured Coop. Lead.
Gender Ratio 0.76 (0.23)a 0.56 (0.34) 0.52 (0.30)
Proportion of Cooperative Choices
Time 1 0.62 (0.49) 0.79(0.41) 0.84 (0.36)
Time 2 0.55 (0.50) 0.88 (0.32) 0.84 (0.36)
Time 3 0.65 (0.48) 0.82 (0.39) 0.75 (0.43)
Time 4 0.55 (0.50) 0.88 (0.33) 0.65 (0.48)
Time 5 0.55(0.50) 0.88 (0.33) 0.65 (0.48)
Time 6 0.55 (0.50) 0.85 (0.36) 0.56 (0.50)
Integrative Complexity Discussion
Time 1 3.54(1.14) 4.06(1.11) 3.53(1.08)
Time 2 3.00(1.29) 3.54(1.27) 3.68(1.03)
Time 3 2.67(1.17) 3.15(1.25) 2.78(0.87)
Time 4 2.54(1.32) 3.00(1.17) 2.81(0.97)
Time 5 2.66(0.97) 3.06(1.27) 2.78(0.94)
Time 6 2.82(1.27) 2.63(.92) 2.75(.98)
Team Greed
Time 1 4.36(1.25) 3.91(1.45) 3.93(1.08)
Time 2 4.32(1.55) 3.63(1.28) 4.14(1.33)
Time 3 4.10(1.58) 3.63(1.34) 4.09(1.40)
Time 4 4.33(1.68) 3.58(1.59) 4.23(1.46)
Time 5 4.29(1.75) 3.51(1.65) 4.29(1.55)
Time 6 5.77(1.17) 5.42(1.18) 5.54(0.99)
Team Fear
Time 1 4.79(1.05) 4.12(1.18) 4.28(0.98)
Time 2 4.63(1.37) 4.23(1.29) 4.37(1.02)
Time 3 4.68(1.46) 4.23(1.34) 4.17(1.23)
Time 4 4.70(1.56) 4.13(1.51) 4.18(1.31)
Time 5 4.68(1.61) 3.81(1.47) 4.54(1.25)
Time 6 4.72(1.44) 3.64(1.39) 4.27(1.36)
Compliance toward Cooperation
Time 1 0.46(0.51) 0.62(0.49) 0.91(0.30)
Time 2 0.50(0.51) 0.47(0.51) 0.75(0.44)
Time 3 0.54(0.51) 0.41(0.50) 0.53(0.51)
Time 4 0.42(0.50) 0.26(0.45) 0.53(0.51)
Time 5 0.23(0.43) 0.41(0.50) 0.41(0.50)
Time 6 0.23(0.43) 0.26(0.45) 0.34(0.48)
a Standard deviations in parentheses.
4 We also used one-way ANOVA to compare average levels of cooperation and in-
tegrative complexity across conditions. Results were consistent with HLM analyses.
5 All hypotheses were also tested using three-level HLM analyses in which two
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variable (e.g., multiple assessments of group decisions, group greed,
group fear, and integrative complexity), and group level was the level 2
variable (e.g., group conditions, group gender ratio). Accordingly, a
hierarchical regression model using the HLM program was used to test
hypotheses. The results of these analyses are summarized in Tables 2
and 3. Our basic models may be represented as:
= + + −
+ − + + +
b b D
D b b e
Y (Gender Ratio ) (Structured discussion )
(Cooperative leader) (Time ) (X ) ,
ij 0[i] 1 i 01 i
02 i 2 ij 3 ij ij
≈ σb N(β , ),i0[ ] 0 b0
where i= 1…N, j= 1…T, Yij represents one of the dependent variables
in the study (e.g., integrative complexity, greed, fear, decisions to
compete,6, etc…) for the ith group at the jth time period; b0[i] is a
random eﬀect reﬂecting heterogeneity in team intercepts; Gender ratioi
is a group-level covariate. Xij represents speciﬁc independent variables
used to examine the hypothesized relationships (e.g., integrative com-
plexity, greed, and fear) for the ith group measured at the jth time
point, and b3 represents ﬁxed eﬀects that capture the common re-
lationships between the model predictors and the Yij. The three con-
ditions were dummy coded into D01 and D02, where D01 is a comparison
between the structured-discussion condition and the control condition
and D02 is a comparison between the cooperative-leader condition and
the control condition. Timeij is a variable corresponding to a value that
represents multiple PDG rounds that ranges between 0 and 5 for the ith
group measured at the jth time point, and b2 indicates the average slope
across all groups. The time variable is treated as a covariate for
Hypotheses 1–3. For Hypothesis 4, which focuses on changes in deci-
sions over time, we modeled the interaction eﬀect between time and
condition variable to test the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence in their
slopes (i.e., changes in decisions) across diﬀerent conditions.
4.4. Hypothesis testing
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 proposed that group integrative com-
plexity would increase the likelihood of a decision to cooperate. To
examine the hypothesis, we entered the group’s integrative complexity
to predict decisions to cooperate (Table 2). Consistent with our hy-
pothesis, integrative complexity positively predicted groups’ decisions
to cooperate (γ=0.93, p < .01).
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 proposed that group integrative com-
plexity would negatively lead to group greed and fear, and in turn in-
crease the likelihood of a decision to cooperate. To examine the hy-
pothesis, we entered the group’s integrative complexity to predict group
greed and fear (Table 2). Consistent with our hypothesis, integrative
complexity negatively predicted group greed (γ=−0.13, p < .01)
and group fear (γ=−0.11, p < .01). These indicate that a group’s
integrative complexity reduced greed and fear regarding the other
group and increased intergroup cooperation. We also tested the re-
lationships between greed, fear, and decisions to cooperate. Consistent
with the hypothesis, group greed (γ=−0.78, p < .01) and group fear
(γ=−1.14, p < .01) negatively predicted decisions to cooperate.
The hypothesis also proposed that greed and fear would mediate the
relationship between group integrative complexity and intergroup co-
operation. To evaluate the mediating relationships, we examined the
signiﬁcance of each hypothesized indirect eﬀect using the z′ method
recommended by MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoﬀman, West, and Sheets
(2002), and our results supported these mediating relationships. Spe-
ciﬁcally, greed mediated the relationship between integrative com-
plexity and decisions to cooperate, (z′)= 2.40, p < .05, and fear
mediated the relationship between integrative complexity and decisions
Table 2
Eﬀects of integrative complexity on greed, fear, and decisions to cooperate.
Criterion Greed Fear Decisions to Cooperate Decisions to Cooperate
Fixed Eﬀects γ se t-value γ se t-value γ se t-value γ se t-value
Intercept, γ00
Gender Ratioa, γ01 0.47 0.35 1.36 0.15 0.35 0.44 −1.07 0.98 −1.09 −1.37 1.12 −1.21
Integrative Complexity, γ10 −0.13 0.05 −2.77** −0.11 0.03 −3.26** 0.93 0.19 4.75** 0.64 0.12 5.33**
Time, γ40 0.20 0.02 7.98** −0.05 0.03 −2.12* −0.17 0.11 −1.57 −0.01 0.07 −0.19
Greed, γ20 −0.78 0.16 −4.86**
Fear, γ30 −1.14 0.22 −5.29**
a Group gender composition.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
Table 3
Eﬀects of discussion interventions on integrative complexity and decisions to cooperate.
Criterion Integrative Complexity Decision to Cooperate Decision to Cooperate
Fixed Eﬀects γ se t-value γ se t-value γ se t-value
Intercept, γ00
Gender Ratioa 0.04 0.22 0.18 −0.42 0.75 −0.56 −0.50 0.91 −0.56
Structured Dis., D01 0.38 0.15 2.53* 1.73 0.53 3.25** 2.09 0.66 3.17**
Coop. Leader, D02 0.19 0.15 1.21 0.72 0.53 1.35 1.03 0.65 1.57
Time, γ60 −0.19 0.03 −6.39** −0.15 0.09 −1.69
Structured Dis., D61 0.21 0.14 1.56
Coop. Leader, D62 −0.50 0.14 −3.66**
a Group gender composition;
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
(footnote continued)
interacting groups were treated as a Level-3 variable that represents group-pair level.
Results were consistent with the hypotheses and results of the two-level HLM analyses
presented here.
6 In case of a dichotomous dependent variable such as decision to compete, we used a
logistic HLM model that allows binomial distribution of dependent variables.
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to cooperate, (z′)= 2.78, p < .01. Therefore, the results supported our
proposed model, whereby group integrative complexity decreased
greed and fear, which in turn increased the likelihood that a decision to
cooperate would be made.
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 proposed that structured group discus-
sion would increase the integrative complexity of group discussion. We
compared groups in the control condition with those in the structured-
discussion condition in terms of their integrative complexity (Table 3).
Speciﬁcally, a dummy-coded variable that represents the contrast be-
tween the structured-discussion condition versus the control condition
was entered to predict the integrative complexity demonstrated during
group discussion. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, structured-discussion
groups revealed higher integrative complexity than control-condition
groups (γ=0.38, p < .05). A dummy-coded cooperative-leader con-
dition (compared to the control condition) revealed no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on integrative complexity (γ=0.19, p=n.s.), which is consistent with
our prediction that having a cooperative leader manage group discus-
sion would not increase the integrative complexity of group discussion.
In addition, we also tested whether structured group discussion in-
creased groups’ decisions to cooperate (Table 3). Consistent with our
prediction, structured-discussion groups made signiﬁcantly more deci-
sions to cooperate than control-condition groups (γ=1.73, p < .01).
The cooperative-leader condition (compared to the control condition)
revealed no signiﬁcant eﬀect on decisions to cooperate (γ=0.72,
p=n.s.).
Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 proposed although cooperative-leader
groups would be more likely to cooperate in early decisions, they would
fail to maintain cooperation over time. The pattern of cooperation rates
shown in Fig. 3 oﬀers initial support for the hypothesis, by which we
could observe that the cooperation rates of cooperative-leader groups
declined in later rounds. We examined whether this decrease in co-
operation rates is statistically signiﬁcant for the cooperative-leader
condition using an intercepts and slopes-as-outcomes model in which,
over time, the trend for cooperation rates (i.e., slope) is predicted by the
two variables that represent the structured-discussion condition and the
cooperative-leader condition (Table 3). Consistent with Hypothesis 4,
there was a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the cooperative-leader con-
dition on cooperation over time (γ=−0.50, p < .01), such that
groups in the cooperative-leader condition showed a decrease in co-
operation rates over time. In contrast, there was no signiﬁcant slope
eﬀect of the structured-discussion condition on decisions to cooperate
(γ=0.21, p=n.s.).
The model in Fig. 1 proposed that group integrative complexity
would mediate the relationship between group discussion dynamics
(i.e., structured group discussion), greed and fear, and intergroup co-
operation. To evaluate the mediating relationships, we examined the
signiﬁcance of each hypothesized indirect eﬀect using the z′ method
recommended by MacKinnon et al. (2002), and our results supported
these mediating relationships. Speciﬁcally, integrative complexity
mediated the relationship between structured intervention and greed,
(z′)= 1.87, p < .05, and between structured discussion and fear,
(z′)=1.99, p < .05. Together with Hypothesis 2 results, which sup-
ported greed and fear as mediators between integrative complexity and
decisions to cooperate, the results supported our proposed model
whereby structured discussion decreased greed and fear by facilitating
groups’ integrative complexity, which in turn increased the likelihood
that a decision to cooperate would be made.
4.4.1. Social decision scheme analysis
In this paper, we have argued that having a structured discussion
would increase the integrative complexity of groups and that, as a re-
sult, they would be less likely to be inﬂuenced by normative-con-
forming pressure and more likely to consider each alternative. We used
SDS analysis (Davis, 1973) to test how diﬀerent group discussion in-
terventions inﬂuenced group decision-making dynamics. When groups
have a low level of integrative complexity, they are more inﬂuenced by
intergroup tension and stereotyped views of out-groups and engage in
consensus-seeking processes instead of broadening their understanding
of diﬀerent options. Also, they are more likely to be subject to nor-
mative-conforming inﬂuences by which group decisions are based on
the opinion’s popularity (i.e., the opinion of the majority faction). In-
deed, Hastie and Kameda (2005) argue that groups often rely on ma-
jority/plurality aggregation heuristics in their attempt to reach a con-
sensus. This predicts that groups in the control condition and the
cooperative-leader condition will be more likely to follow majority rule.
In the structured-discussion condition, groups were encouraged to have
a discussion in which they thoroughly considered diﬀerent alternatives,
regardless of each one’s popularity, thereby increasing the groups’ in-
tegrative complexity. Therefore, we expected a greater tendency to-
ward cooperative decisions for those groups in the structured-discus-
sion condition.
In our study, prior to making a group decision about whether to
cooperate or compete, each member made his/her individual decision
privately and submitted it to the experimenter. As a result, we were
able to describe members’ initial choice distribution and the groups’
subsequent consensus processes using SDS analysis (Davis, 1973).
Table 4 shows how groups with the same individual preference splits
had diﬀerent opportunities to decide to cooperate or compete across the
three conditions.7 In the structured-discussion condition, a minority
favoring cooperation won about 68% of the time; in the control con-
dition, the minority favoring cooperation won about 44% of the time; in
the cooperative-leader condition, a minority favoring cooperation won
Fig. 3. Cooperation over Rounds and Conditions.
7 Due to the loss of some individual decision sheets, we had data on only 84 out of 95
groups for these analyses. Cooperation rates for the reduced sample size due to the data
loss (n=84) were highly similar to cooperation rates for the full sample (N=95).
G. Park, R.P. DeShon Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 146 (2018) 62–75
70
about 54% of the time. In the structured-discussion condition, a ma-
jority favoring cooperation won about 85% of the time; in the control
condition, a majority favoring cooperation won about 64% of the time;
in the cooperative-leader condition, a majority favoring cooperation
won about 78% of the time.
We examined three decision-making models (i.e., symmetric ma-
jority, proportionality model, and strong cooperation asymmetric
model) for its adequacy in describing the social combinational process
for groups in the three conditions. A simple majority model predicts
that regardless of cooperation or competition, a faction with a majority
of members determines group decisions. A proportionality model pre-
dicts that each decision has an equal proportional chance of winning
the group decision. A strong cooperation asymmetric model predicts
that cooperation has a strong asymmetric advantage over competition.
For groups in the structured-discussion condition, the predictions of
a symmetric majority (χ2(1, N=180)= 52.38, p < .01) and a pro-
portionality model (χ2(1, N=180)= 60, p < .01) could be rejected as an
adequate description of the data. On the other hand, the predictions of a
strong cooperation asymmetric model could not be rejected (χ2(1,
N=180)= 3.39, p= n.s.). For groups in the control condition, the pre-
dictions of a symmetric majority model (χ2(1, N=155)= 0.6, p=n.s.) and
proportionality model (χ2(1, N=155)= 1.05, p=n.s.) could not be re-
jected. In contrast, the predictions of a strong cooperation asymmetric
model could be rejected (χ2(1, N=155)= 33.55, p < .01). For groups in
the cooperative-leader condition, the predictions of a symmetric ma-
jority model could not be rejected (χ2(1, N=168)= 0.01, p=n.s.).
However, the predictions of a proportionality (χ2(1, N=168)= 4.16,
p < .05) and strong cooperation asymmetric model (χ2(1,
N=168)= 14.79, p < .01) could be rejected. Groups in the control
condition were more likely to follow a majority rule or proportionality
rule. Groups in the cooperative-leader condition were more likely to
follow a majority rule. This indicate that those groups did not parti-
cularly accommodate decisions to cooperate during group discussion. In
structured-discussion groups, cooperative opinions had more opportu-
nities to be heard and inﬂuenced groups to become more cooperative
regardless of the size of the cooperative faction.
4.4.2. Exploratory analyses of the odds of deciding to compete a second
time
Our results indicate that structured-discussion groups successfully
maintained their cooperative relationships over multiple interactions.
In contrast, cooperative-leader groups failed to maintain cooperation
over time and became highly competitive in later rounds. A Chi-square
analysis comparing the probability of competing once versus multiple
times across conditions was signiﬁcant, χ2(2, n=179)= 9.49, p < .05.
This suggests that the three conditions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in
terms of their probability of relapsing into decisions to compete. The
odds of competing again, given a previous competition, was 1.41 in the
control condition, 3.16 in the cooperative-leader condition, and 0.78 in
the structured-discussion condition. This means that after deciding once
to compete, groups in the control and cooperative-leader conditions
were more likely to compete. Groups in the structured-discussion con-
dition, however, did not increase their probability of competing after
deciding previously to compete. Also, the odds ratio for the
cooperative-leader condition against the structured-discussion condi-
tion was 3.83, which means that the odds of repeated competition was
3.83 times higher in the cooperative-leader condition than the struc-
tured-discussion condition. The odds ratio of competition rates for the
cooperative-leader condition against the control condition was 2.17,
which means that the odds of repeated competition was 2.17 times
higher in the cooperative-leader condition than the control condition.
Similarly, we also examined the odds of taking revenge, or deciding
to compete after being competed against by the opponent group, across
the three conditions. The Chi-square result indicated that groups dif-
fered signiﬁcantly in their response to competitive opponents across
conditions, χ2(2, n=179)= 9.62, p < .05. The odds of competing after a
previous competitive decision made by the opponent was 1.56 in the
control condition, 2.81 in the cooperative-leader condition, and 0.72 in
the structured-discussion condition. This means that upon their oppo-
nents’ decision to compete, groups in the cooperative-leader and con-
trol conditions were more likely to compete against their opponents.
The odds ratio for the control condition against the structured-discus-
sion condition was 2.16, which means the odds of taking revenge were
2.16 times higher for groups in the control condition than in the
structured-discussion condition. The odds ratio for the cooperative-
leader condition against the structured-discussion condition was 3.84,
which means that the odds of taking revenge was 3.84 times higher for
groups in the cooperative-leader condition than in the structured-dis-
cussion condition.
These interaction patterns suggest that groups in the structured-
discussion condition were less likely to repeat their decisions to com-
pete and also less likely to retaliate against their opponents’ competi-
tiveness with further competition. Groups in the structured-discussion
condition were able to maintain cooperation over repeated inter-
actions—not only because they did not compete to start with, but also
because they were better able to douse the competitive ﬂames that the
groups in the other conditions could not.
4.4.3. Exploratory analysis of compliance with cooperative opinion
In addition to hypothesizing and then demonstrating the relation-
ship between structured discussion and integrative complexity, we
predicted that cooperative-leader discussion would mainly rely on the
normative-conforming power a discussion leader possesses at the be-
ginning of the discussion. Therefore, we expected that although co-
operative-leader discussion would not successfully increase the in-
tegrative complexity of the group discussion, it would increase team
members’ compliance with cooperative opinions. To test our prediction,
we identiﬁed the extent to which team members conformed to co-
operative opinions during group discussion across all three conditions.
Consistent with our prediction, cooperative-leader discussion success-
fully increased team members’ expression of compliance with co-
operative options, compared to the control condition (γ=0.80,
p < .05). Groups in the structured-discussion condition did not show
signiﬁcantly higher compliance with the cooperative choice
(γ=−0.03, p=n.s.). This indicates that the cooperative-leader con-
dition facilitated greater normative-conforming pressure to agree with
cooperation decisions; the structured-discussion condition did not exert
such pressure.
Table 4
Observed Social Decision Scheme Matrix for Choices Divided by Condition.
Member
Choices
Control
Groups (n=26)
Structured
Groups (n=30)
Cooperative
Leader Groups (n=28)
C D N C D N C D N C D
3 0 53 0.94 0.06 90 0.97 0.03 82 0.98 0.02
2 1 28 0.64 0.36 40 0.85 0.15 32 0.78 0.22
1 2 27 0.44 0.56 25 0.68 0.32 26 0.54 0.46
0 3 47 0.17 0.83 25 0.44 0.56 28 0.11 0.89
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5. Discussion
Previous research has shown the distinctively exploitative nature of
intergroup relations compared to interpersonal relations, and these
ﬁndings predict poor outcomes for recommendations intended to fa-
cilitate intergroup cooperation that focus on individual group members
(e.g., Meier & Hinsz, 2004; Song, 2009; Wildschut et al., 2003). Unlike
interindividual or intragroup relations, in which communication in-
creases the likelihood that group members will cooperate (Dawes,
1980; Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, & Van De Kragt, 1986; Insko et al.,
1993), a meta-analysis by Wildschut et al. (2003) demonstrated that
intergroup communication, regardless of the richness of the medium,
has no eﬀect on building cooperative intergroup relations. Because of
groups’ tendencies to distrust and suspect other groups’ willingness to
cooperate and keep their promises, intergroup communication serves to
reinforce negative stereotypes about the out-group. Making things
worse, careful examination of the literature suggests that group dis-
cussion often strengthens groups’ exploitative intentions with respect to
other groups, because competitive opinions are allowed to spread, and
thoughtful discussion of diﬀerent perspectives becomes diﬃcult
(Morgan & Tindale, 2002). Therefore, groups that use a simple, heur-
istic-driven group decision-making process would be more likely to rely
on heuristics associated with intergroup relations, such as in-group
favoritism and out-group distrust, and they are more likely to exhibit
stereotypical reactions guided by greed and fear against other groups
(Janis, 1982; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977).
This study suggests that the integrative complexity of group dis-
cussion can enhance groups’ decisions to cooperate with other groups:
Groups that were prompted to use a high-quality decision-making
process were more likely to cooperate with other groups, compared to
groups that did not use such prompts. When groups engage in high
integrative complexity discussion, they are better able to advance, in-
tegrate, and elaborate on diverse views and issues while suppressing the
emergence of greed and fear, which are heuristics associated with in-
tergroup relations. Therefore, integrative complexity prevents groups
from reaching decisions based on reasoning that relies on dominant
stereotypes against out-groups. Moreover, when groups reached their
decision through high integrative-complexity discussion, they were
better able to maintain cooperative relationships with the other group
and were less likely to repeat their competitive interaction. A high-
quality decision-making process encouraged groups to remain open and
ﬂexible in the face of intergroup conﬂict, and they became more ef-
fective in preventing later competitive interactions. Indeed, in their
review of successful reconciliation of international conﬂict, Long and
Brecke (2003) argue that intergroup conﬂicts are more likely to be
resolved when group actions are seen by the opponent as unexpected
and novel, such as making a nonbinding cooperative promise or vo-
luntary provision of valuable resources to the opponent. Integrative
complexity allows groups to bypass their typical reﬂexive responses in
conﬂict situations and remain open to strategies to return to a co-
operative relationship.
In addition, this study examined the eﬀect of having a cooperative
leader on group discussion and groups’ decisions to cooperate with the
other groups. We argued that from a quality of group discussion per-
spective, having a cooperative leader wound not necessarily improve
the integrative complexity of group discussion. At the same time,
having a cooperative discussion leader can increase a group’s reliance
on the leader’s opinion when reaching a consensus—especially during
the initial phases, when normative inﬂuence is stronger. Studies on
group discussion report that groups typically begin their discussions by
disclosing individual preferences (Gigone & Hastie, 1993). Diﬀerences
in their preferences are then combined to reach a group decision. As the
discussion leader serves as a reference point for a group’s consensus-
seeking process, groups are likely to reach a consensus around a deci-
sion to cooperate.
A cooperative discussion leader can activate normative inﬂuence,
by which members comply with others in order to meet their ex-
pectations (Campbell & Fairey, 1989). As expected, both structured-
discussion and cooperative-leader discussion showed high levels of
cooperation for the ﬁrst three rounds, but only structured-discussion
groups were able to sustain the cooperation. This indicates that a
group’s decision to cooperate based on deep, systematic discussion of
alternatives would be more likely to sustain cooperation over time; in
contrast, a group’s decision to cooperate based on following the group
authority’s opinion and heuristic-driven discussion was not sustainable.
Therefore, our ﬁndings in the cooperative-leader groups further high-
light the importance of group discussion quality on a group’s decisions
to cooperate and intergroup relations. Cooperation that was attained
through a high integrative-complexity discussion was sustained,
whereas cooperation that was reached through a cooperative leader’s
inﬂuence was fragile and susceptible to future conﬂict. We believe that
our ﬁndings regarding the cooperative-leader condition do not under-
value a leader’s role in intergroup relations, but rather underscore how
leaders should facilitate a high level of integrative complexity during
group discourse, such that s/he can establish sustainable, long-lasting,
mutually beneﬁcial intergroup cooperation.
This study meaningfully extends previous ﬁndings on inter-
individual-intergroup discontinuity eﬀects by examining the eﬀects of
group discussion on intergroup social dilemma outcomes. As summar-
ized in footnote 2, our ﬁndings are consistent with previous studies of
the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity eﬀect, such that groups
were signiﬁcantly more competitive than individuals. While the co-
operation rates for our control groups seemed higher than those of
previous studies of interindividual-intergroup dynamics, we believe this
is probably due to the repetitive nature of the interaction. In addition,
consistent with the traditional approach to intergroup social dilemma
studies, a greed- and fear-mediation model was supported in our ana-
lyses such that greed and fear worked as the major determinants of
groups’ decisions to cooperate. Going beyond previous studies in the
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity eﬀect that have focused on
identifying factors that cause groups to decide to compete against other
groups, this study provides an intervention that could motivate groups
to become more cooperative. More importantly, our results demon-
strate that integrative complexity—that is, the quality of group dis-
cussion—is the main condition that predicts a group’s decision to co-
operate after controlling for the eﬀects of greed and fear (Table 2). This
result further highlights the important role of group decision-making
dynamics in group decisions to cooperate and intergroup cooperation.
In this study, all groups were given the same amount of time to think
about their decisions and discuss their decisions, yet groups that en-
gaged in structured discussion that facilitated integrative complexity
achieved signiﬁcantly more cooperative relationships than groups that
did not. Therefore, this study answers the call for more social dilemma
studies that identify and examine diﬀerent ways to resolve intergroup
competition and conﬂicts.
In a related vein, this study answers the call for further investigation
of how group decision-making dynamics are linked to intergroup re-
lations (Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Morgan & Tindale, 2002). In particular,
growing evidence links integrative complexity and intergroup relations.
For example, hostile interactions between Al Qaeda and the U.S. since
the start of the war against terrorism closely reﬂect ﬂuctuations in the
level of integrative complexity demonstrated in leaders’ speeches or
public statements intended to explain their positions and decisions
(Conway et al., 2011). The more a leader uses simple rhetoric, such as
calling the opponent evil or declaring that their group’s demands are
not open to debate—i.e., a sign of low integrative complexity—the
more likely that the speaker’s group will be hostile toward the other
group. While these studies have undoubtedly contributed to our un-
derstanding of intergroup relations and decision making, they are cor-
relational because they relied on archival data that could have been
biased (Suedfeld, 2010). For instance, concern for impression man-
agement and cultural diﬀerences might have inﬂuenced how groups
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communicate their position to the audience, regardless of what may
have actually been considered during the decision-making process. In
addition, the eﬀects of having a cooperative leader and experiencing
integrative complexity are diﬃcult to disentangle in those studies,
which renders it more diﬃcult to understand the causal mechanism of a
leader’s cooperative orientation, group integrative complexity, and
group decisions to cooperate. This study complements such previous
studies of integrative complexity and intergroup relations by directly
manipulating decision-making and integrative complexity to demon-
strate the beneﬁts of using a high-quality decision-making process. This
study also shows that having a cooperative leader, as it does not stop
groups from relying on a heuristics-driven, consensus-seeking process,
fail to maintain their cooperative stance over time. Our study, there-
fore, provides supportive evidence that integrative complexity is an
eﬀective approach for understanding and managing intergroup rela-
tions.
5.1. Limitations and future research
In this study, two interacting groups were placed in the same con-
dition; this limits the ﬁndings’ generalizability. For example, groups in
the structured-discussion condition might have believed that their op-
ponents were also thinking through diﬀerent options before making
their ﬁnal decision. Understanding an opponent’s decision-making
process, in turn, could have led to more a cooperative stance toward the
opponent. Past research also suggests that the similarity in two inter-
acting decision-makers’ cognitive complexity positively leads to success
in crisis negotiation, as it makes it easier to predict the other’s actions
and understand their oﬀers and counteroﬀers (Santmire et al., 1998).
However, we generally expect that having only one group undergo an
intervention would lead to similar results. For example, in a negotiation
study involving two individuals, having one negotiator with high
epistemic motivation increased the integrative agreement of the dyad
(Ten Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, 2010).
In a similar vein, we only had a cooperative person lead group
discussion in the cooperative-leader condition, and we cannot reach a
conclusion about the more general eﬀect of a leader’s presence on co-
operative intergroup relations. Based on previous studies, however, we
can expect that having a leader would not necessarily increase decisions
to cooperate. A group representative follows an in-group favoritism
norm and is more competitive against the out-group (Song, 2009).
Therefore, the chance of developing competitive relationships would
remain high unless the group leader manages the discussion in a
manner that establishes high integrative complexity.
This study examined the interactive dynamics of two groups using a
PDG in a laboratory, and its setting may not strongly resemble real-
world interactions between groups. One of the biggest diﬀerences in
real organizations would be that the two groups could have diﬀerent
needs and priorities, such that their outcome matrix would not be as
equal as we have assumed in this study. Similarly, group members
might have motives and rewards that diverge from what we tested,
which were mainly economic motives and unitary groups. Also, real-
world groups have more time to discuss their decisions than the groups
in this study, which would increase their chance of having a systematic
discussion.
While these idiosyncratic diﬀerences between PDGs and real-world
settings can have an impact on intergroup relations and should be
considered, we believe that they should not be the basis for determining
the study’s generalizability, as external validity does not necessarily
result from ensuring that experimental settings are similar to the real
world. Rather, such validity is based on building an accurate under-
standing of the core mechanisms involved in the theory being tested
(Highhouse, 2009). We investigated the causal mechanism for group
decision-making dynamics and intergroup cooperation, and a lab study
using the PDG provides an optimal environment in which to build and
test our theoretical assumptions; observing the PDG being played by
groups under diﬀerent group-discussion conditions allowed us to ex-
tract key variables of interest and carefully test our hypotheses. More-
over, our ﬁndings replicate the well-established eﬀect of inter-
individual-intergroup discontinuity, as well as the approach that treats
greed and fear as the mediating factors for decisions to cooperate.
Nevertheless, we highly encourage future studies conducted in real-
world settings to provide further evidence of various social-interaction
dynamics within groups and their role in intergroup competition and
cooperation.
In a related vein, groups in this study engaged in two minutes of
discussion before deciding to cooperate or compete with other group.
While two minutes of discussion seems too short, the length of time was
carefully designed in this study after considering various factors. First,
during our pilot testing of the study’s manipulation and procedures, we
found that two minutes of discussion was enough; participants reported
feeling that they had been given enough time to engage in discussion.
Second, we closely followed previous procedures, and two minutes was
the most common time limit for group discussion in interindividual-
intergroup social dilemma studies (e.g., Insko et al., 1990, 1994, 2001;
Pinter et al., 2007; Schopler et al., 1995).
In addition, the average level of integrative complexity was around
midpoint 2.87 in control groups. This indicates that average groups,
without any intervention, were able to reach diﬀerentiation during the
two minutes of discussion. Having said that, we believe it is important
to note the potential limitation of the short discussion time. In the real
world, groups would have more time to decide (and more information
and options to consider), and this might inﬂuence their decision-
making quality and decisions to cooperate. Group discussion length has
been positively related to group epistemic motivation and group dis-
cussion quality, such that the longer a group discusses the matter, it is
more likely that diﬀerent opinions will be expressed and improve the
quality of group decisions (e.g., Bechtoldt, De Dreu, Nijstad, & Choi,
2010; Stasser, 1999). Groups in the real world would require longer
time to reach a high level of integrative complexity, as there would be
many factors and issues to be deliberated and integrated.
We also encourage future studies that examine various factors that
impact complex information processing by groups and intergroups,
such as accountability, time pressure, and a consensus norm (e.g.,
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Scholten et al., 2007; Staw et al., 1981).
6. Conclusion
Despite the importance of establishing cooperative intergroup in-
teractions in an organization, researchers have consistently found that
achieving cooperation between groups is disproportionately more dif-
ﬁcult than achieving cooperation between individuals (Insko et al.,
2013; Wildschut et al., 2003). Groups are predisposed to be in conﬂict
with and compete with other groups (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; De Dreu,
1998); in this context, human beings naturally tend to act competitively
and aggressively (Nowak, 2006). Indeed, individuals have learned to
associate intergroup contact with an increased sense of tension and
fear, which encourages groups to rely on a simple, heuristic-driven
discussion that further exacerbates the group’s sense of competition
with the other group (Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Suedfeld & Tetlock,
1977). As Janis (1982) found in his original groupthink case studies,
group members in the presence of out-groups tend to quickly polarize in
their decisions to compete, and show a heightened aggressive intent
that compensates for the poor quality of group decisions and worsens
intergroup relations.
This study addresses one of the long-standing questions in group
processes: the relationship between groupthink and intergroup dy-
namics. Using an integrative-complexity approach, we demonstrate the
role that heuristic-driven group decision-making can play in intergroup
conﬂict and how it can be a means for improving intergroup relations.
With integrative complexity, groups in the structured-discussion con-
dition could eﬀectively counteract the immediate and strong need for
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in-group cohesion and unity against out-groups, and assuage their greed
and fear against other groups. Upon an outbreak of competition, groups
in the structured-discussion condition were signiﬁcantly less likely to
favor subsequent competition. This further highlights the beneﬁts of
integrative complexity: being open and ﬂexible to diﬀerent alternatives
under highly uncertain and contentious intergroup situations. While a
cooperative discussion leader increased groups’ decisions to cooperate
for the initial interactions, such leaders did not enhance the integrative
complexity of group discussion and failed to maintain cooperation over
time. By proposing and testing two discussion interventions, this study
provides practical solutions for how intergroup relations can be im-
proved.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the
online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.04.001.
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